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... if you were to apply to them 
[General Westmoreland and other 
U.S. generals] the same standards 
that were applied to General 
Yamashita, there would be a very 
strong possibility that they would 
come to the same end as he did. 1 
The preceding assertion by Professor 
Telford Taylor, the U.S. prosecutor at 
Nuremberg after World War II, is a 
benchmark in the current discussion of 
war crimes and Vietnam. For the first 
time, a reputable scholar of moderate 
persuasion suggested the possibility that 
American military leaders be tried for 
their responsibilities in the conduct of 
the Indochina war. Taylor's book 
Nuremberg and Vietnam became an 
instant success, and his analogy concern· 
ing Yamashita is regularly cited in the 
debate over the U.S. conduct of the 
war. Variations of Taylor's Yamashita 
analogy, often including the word 
"Nuremberg," are freely bandied about 
in the more important organs of the 
American press. This publicity has con· 
tributed to widespread belief that a 
general principle of international law 
concerning command responsibility was 
established in the Yamashita case and 
that application of the so-called Yama· 
shita principle to the Vietnam war 
wouid work to the detriment of U.S. 
leaders. 
The popular view of the Yamashita 
case is well expressed in the following 
passage from Taylor's book: 
There was no charge that General 
Yamashita had approved, much 
less ordered these barbarities and 
no evidence that he knew of them 
other than the inference that he 
must have because of their 
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extent. ... Nevertheless, the tri-
bunal found Yamashita guilty on 
the ground that he had 
" .... failed to provide effective 
control of his troops as required 
by the circumstances" and 
sentenced him to death by hang-
ing.2 
Unquestioningly accepting this per-
ception of the Yamashita case, many 
writers and commentators on the Viet-
nam war would then agree with Taylor's 
conclusion quoted in the beginning of 
this article that U.S. military leaders 
would meet Yamashita's fate if sub-
jected to the standards of his trial. 
Most members of the press and the 
academic community have adopted Tay-
lor's thesis at face value without 
examining it closely. None apparently 
have wondered .why Nuremberg prose-
cutor Taylor, responsible for the trial 
and imprisonment of a large number of 
senior German military leaders, chose to 
select as his standard and precedent the 
result of an American Military Com-
mission in the Far East that was not 
conducted under international auspices. 
The issues arising over "command 
responsibility" as an international law 
of war concept can be stated precisely. 
The popular perception of the Yama-
shita principle is that it established a 
rule that a military commander was 
responsible for the breaches of law 
committed by members of his command 
whether or not he personally knew 
about them. Yet, 2 and then 3 years 
after the Yamashita case, international 
military tribunals operating in a judi-
cially restrained atmosphere at Nurem-
berg articulated a restricted standard of 
command responsibility which required 
that a military commander had to be 
personally derelict to be found guilty. 3 
Why has Nuremberg been ignored in the 
headlines linking My Lai and Yama-
shita? Can Nuremberg and Yamashita be 
reconciled? 
This paper seeks to examine the 
concept of cClmmand responsibility 
formulated under the international law 
of war. Command responsibility con-
cerns the responsibility of a military 
commander for the actions of his sub-
ordinates. Inherent in this discussion is 
the development of this concept in the 
Yamashita and Nuremberg trials and 
then application of the internationally 
recognized standard to U.S. conduct in 
Vietnam. 
A final preliminary point is that in 
his recent book Professor Telford Tay-
lor subsumed under the rubric of 
"Yarnashita Case" an argument he had 
put forward at the Nuremberg tribunals 
more than two decades ago. His argu-
ment of absolute command respon-
sibility was categorically and expressly 
rejected in the Nuremberg "High Com-
mand Case.,,4 The Nuremberg section 
of this study will document that result. 
Recognition of Taylor's attempt to 
resurrect a previously rejected argument 
is important because it indicates the 
confusion and misunderstandings extant 
in the field of command responsibility. 
At a time when men's lives and 
reputations are at stake, it is distressing 
to read as great a denial of legal crafts-
manship and law as has been evidenced 
in Professor Taylor's comment in the 
introduction to Nuremberg and Viet-
nam: 
For these purposes, the term 
"Nuremberg Trials" should not be 
taken as limi ted to the precise 
rulings of the Nuremberg courts, 
but in its broad sense, as standing 
for all the war crimes trials that 
followed in the wake of the 
Second World War, and the ideas 
they have generated. Today 
"Nuremberg" is both what actu-
ally happened there and what 
people think happened, and the 
second is more important than the 
first. To set the record straight, is, 
no doubt a useful historical exer-
cise, but sea change is itself a 
reality, and it is not the bare 
record but the ethos of Nurem-
berg with which we must reckon 
today. 
Put another way, Nuremberg is 
not only what was said and done 
there, but also what was said 
about it, then and subse-
quently ... 5 
As a constitutional lawyer, Professor 
Taylor knows that such attacks as his 
must be clearly written. Surely it is a 
very questionable practice to establish 
public emotion, rather than precisely 
reasoned judgments, as formulating the 
rules of human behavior. 
Yamashita Case. On 7 December 
1945, an American Military Commission 
of five general officers, sitting in Manila, 
Philippine Islands, found Gen. Toma-
yuki Yamashita, Commanding General 
of the Japanese 14th Army Group in 
the Philippines, guilty of failing to 
discharge his duty by permitting the 
members of his command to commit 
atrocities against Americans and Fili-
pinos in the Philippine Islands during 
the period 9 October 1944 to 2 Septem-
ber 1945 and sentenced him to hang. 
After ultimate recourse to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Yamashita 
was hanged on 23 February 1946.6 
The evidence presented to the Mili-
tary Commission indicated that a signifi-
cant number of atrocities were com-
mitted by members of the Japanese 
military within a short time interval and 
under similar circumstances during the 
dates specified. The 123 specific charges 
alleged a total of tens of thousands of 
deaths.7 General Yamashita contended 
that most of the atrocities were com-
mitted by units or commanders distant 
from his headquarters, either geographi-
cally or in the chain of command, and 
that he had no knowledge of the atroci-
ties. In its judgment, the Commission 
accepted certain of the geographical and 
communications difficulties alleged by 
the Japanese general but concluded that 
these problems were not quite as insur-
mountable aSI Yamashita contended.8 
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The prosecution built its case upon 
proving to the Commission that the 
atrocities had indeed been committed 
and identifying the perpetrators as in-
dividuals or units ultimately subordinate 
to General Yamashita. 9 The core of the 
prosecution's contention is contained in 
the following assertion by the chief 
prosecutor: 
The record itself strongly supports 
the contention or conclusion that 
Yamashita not only permitted but 
ordered the commission of these 
atrocities. However, our case does 
not depend upon any direct 
orders from the accused. It is 
sufficient that we show that the 
accused "permitted" these atroci-
ties. ... Who permitted them? 
Obviously the man whose duty it 
was to prevent such an orgy of 
planned and obviously deliberate 
murder, rape and arson-the com-
mander of those troops! 1 0 
Perhaps concerned that the Military 
Commission would not accept this 
theory and would require proof of 
Yamashita's personal involvement, the 
prosecutor went beyond his stated plan 
and introduced evidence directly linking 
Yamashita to the atrocities. 11 
The judgment of the Military Com-
mission appeared to support the prose-
cutor's contentio"n. The frequently cited 
part of the judgment which established 
for legal onlookers the principles under 
which Yamashita was found guilty reads 
as follows: 
Clearly, assignment to command 
military troops is accompanied by 
broad authority and heavy respon-
sibility. This has been true in all 
armies throughout recorded his-
tory. It is absurd, however, to 
consider a commander a murderer 
or rapist because one of his 
soldiers commits a murder or a 
rape. Nonetheless, if murder and 
rape and vicious, revengeful 
actions are widespread offenses 
and there is no effective attempt 
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by a commander to discover and 
control the criminal acts, such a 
commander may be held respon-
sible, even criminally liable, for 
the lawless acts of his troops, 
depending upon their nature and 
the circumstances surrounding 
them .... 12 
With this statement of principles, the 
Military Commission then went on to 
declare to General Yamashita, u ••• that 
during the period in question you failed 
to provide effective control of your 
troops as required by the circum· 
stances." 
Since this key part of the judgment 
did not address the question of actual 
knowledge on General Yamashita's part 
and because the evidence linking Yama-
shita to the atrocities has been por-
trayed as weak, most legal scholars 
concluded that Yamashita's guilt was 
based upon his commanding a unit 
engaged in such widespread atrocities 
that he should be held responsible for 
them. It is not clear, however, whether 
ascription arises from imputation of a 
constructive knowledge or from a legal 
concept of absolute responsibility. 
In reviewing the Military Commis-
sion's judgment, we find that the U.S. 
generals were impressed by the scope of 
the atrocities and hence believed that 
General Yamashita should have known 
about them or did know and lied about 
his knowledge. The difference between 
the two propositions is significant be-
cause upon it hinges the question as to 
whether or not personal guilt must be 
proved. Unfortunately, the Commis-
sion's judgment failed to discuss ex-
plicitly whether it accepted or rejected 
Yamashita's contention of ignorance. 
Because of their perception of an 
absence of credible evidence linking the 
Japanese general to the proven atroci-
ties, international legal scholars and 
others have usually asserted that the 
Commission accepted Yamashita's state-
ment of ignorance. Yet it is equally as 
credible to assE1rt that the Commission 
believed Yamashita lied as to believe 
that it accepted his word. 
If we reexamine the judgment we can 
find sections in which the Military 
Commission exhibited disbelief at what 
Yamashita told them and seemed con-
vinced that he ordered or knowlingly 
permi tted the atrocities. Consider this 
part of the judgment: 
The prosecution presented evi-
dence to show that the crimes 
were so extensive and widespread, 
both as to time and area, that 
they must either have been wil-
fully permitted by the accused, or 
secretly ordered by the accused. 
Captured orders issued by sub-
ordinate officers of the accused 
were presented as proof that they, 
at least, ordered certain acts lead-
ing directly to exterminations of 
civilians under the guise of elimi-
nating guerrillas hostile to 
Japan. 13 
The Commission's comments con-
cerning Yamashita's method of opera-
tion displayed considerable incredulity. 
The Japanese Commanders testi-
fied that they did not make per-
sonal inspections or independent 
checks during the Philippine cam-
paign to determine for themselves 
the established procedures by 
which their subordinates accom-
plished their missions. Taken at 
full face value, the testimony indi-
cates that Japanese senior com-
manders operate in a vacuum, 
almost in another world with 
respect to their troops, compared 
with standards American generals 
take for granted. 14 
The quoted sections of the judgment 
resulted from the extensive evidence 
introduced by the prosecution which 
purported to show that Yamashita knew 
of the atrocities, ordered some of them, 
and was headquarterd so close to several 
of the scenes of infamy that he could 
not have failed to notice them. Nothing 
in the questioning by the Military 
Commission or in its judgment provides 
a basis to believe that the generals did 
not accept this evidence. The evidence 
linking Yamashita to the atrocities, al· 
though often hearsay, was quite spe· 
cific. IS When one combines the quan-
tity of such evidence with the judgment, 
it becomes difficult to believe that the 
Military Commission accepted Yama-
shita's protestations of ignorance. 
The contention that the Military 
Commission rejected Yamashita's plea 
of ignorance is strengthened by para-
graphs below which describe how a 
Board of Review of Army officers in the 
Pacific informed Gen. Douglas Mac-
Arthur that Yamashita's testimony 
could not be believed 
The review conducted by General 
MacArthur is an important and previ-
ously unpublished part of the Yama-
shita proceedings. MacArthur's con-
firmation of the sentence of hanging 
followed his receipt of a written review 
which asserted that Yamashita had lied. 
The Board of Review of five military 
lawyers, headed by Col. C.M. Ollivetti, 
the Theater Judge Advocate, prepared a 
detailed analysis of the record of trial 
for MacArthur. I 6 
First, the review presented evidence 
of a deliberate Japanese plan of exter-
mination: 
The following evidence indicates a 
deliberate plan of extermination: 
most of the atrocities were com-
mitted during a short period in 
February, 1945 ... and were car-
ried on under the supervision of 
Japanese officers ... following 
the same procedure of concen-
trating the population of a town 
or barrio at a convenient place 
and killing them in an orderly 
manner. ... the large scale upon 
which attempts were made to 
exterminate the male popUlation 
of some places ... and the 
wanton killing of women and chil-
dren ... indicates an intention to 
wipe OUtl the people of the 
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province. The deliberate destruc-
tion of whole towns and barrios 
was also a part of this plan ... I 7 
In short, the Board of Review perceived 
a conspiracy to commit genocide di-
rected or abetted by Yamashita. 
Second, the Board took special note 
of evidence which connected General 
Yamashita with actual knowledge of the 
atrocities perpetrated. Telford Taylor, 
who wrote that there was "no evidence 
that he [Yamashita] knew of them [the 
atrocities] other than the inference that 
he must have because of their extent" I 8 
should be surprised at the amount of 
evidence presented to the Commission 
which indicated knowledge. I 9 Ad-
mittedly, the evidence linking Yama· 
shita to the crimes included a number of 
instances of hearsay evidence and con-
jecture. What is important is that the 
Board of Review apparently believed it 
and described it to General MacArthur 
without cautioning him as to its legal 
validity. 2 0 
Third, the Board of Review reo 
affirmed the validity of the concept of 
command responsibility without ad-
dressing the subject of explicit knowl-
edge raised by the defense. 
But since the duty rests on a 
commander to protect by any 
means in his power both the civil 
population and the prisoners of 
war from wrongful acts of his 
command and since the failure to 
discharge that duty is a violation 
of the Laws of War, there is no 
reason, either in law or morality, 
why he should not be held crimi-
nally responsible for permitting 
such violations by his subordi-
nates, even though that action has 
heretofore seldom or never been 
taken. The responsibility of the 
commander to control his troops 
is well understood by all experi-
enced military men, including 
accused ... 21 
Specific aspects of this command 
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responsibility doctrine were discussed in 
the review when it faulted the accused: 
Although the attitude of the Fili-
pino civilians was one of increas-
ing hostility, he did not, though in 
violation of duty investigate their 
conditions at any time nor did he 
ever inspect prisoner of war or 
civilian internment camps, even 
though one was located at his 
headquarters ... At no time did 
he order, receive any report or 
acquire any knowledge whatever 
of any mistreatment or killing of 
civilians, American prisoners of 
war or civilian internees by the 
military police or any of his sub-
ordinates.22 
Fourth, the disbelief in Yamashita's 
contention that he knew nothing of the 
atrocities, the. Review Board's belief in 
the extermination plan thesis, and the 
credence given the evidence linking 
Yamashita to the crimes are brought 
together in the summary section of the 
review: 
The only real question in the case 
concerns accused's responsibility 
for the atrocities shown to have 
been committed by members of 
his command. Upon this issue a 
careful reading of all the evidence 
impels the conclusion that it 
demonstrates this responsibility. 
In the first place the atrocities 
were so numerous, involved so 
many people, and were so wide-
spread that accused's professed 
ignorance is incredible. Then, too, 
their manner of commission re-
veals a striking similarity of pat-
tern throughout ... in several in-
stances there was direct proof of 
statements by the Japanese par-
ticipants that they were acting 
pursuant to orders of higher au-
thorities, in a few cases Yamashita 
himself being mentioned as the 
source of the order.... All this 
leads to the inevitable conclusion 
that the atrocities were not the 
sporadic acts of soldiers out of 
control but were carried out pur-
suant to a deliberate plan of mass 
extermination which must have 
emanated from higher authority 
or at least had its approval .... 
From the widespread character of 
the atrocities as above outlined, 
the orderliness of their execution 
and the proof that they were done 
pursuant to orders, the conclusion 
is inevitable that the accused 
knew about them and either gave 
his tacit approval to them or at 
least failed to do anything either 
to prevent them or to punish their 
perpetrators. 
There was some evidence in the 
record tending to connect accused 
even more directly with the com-
mission of some of the atroci-
ties ... , While, however, it may be 
conceded that the accused was 
operating under some difficulty 
due to the rapidity of the advance 
of the Americans, there was sub-
stantial evidence in the record 
that the situation was not so bad 
as stated by the accused .... 23 
After the findings and sentence were 
confirmed by General MacArthur, the 
defense appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Without examining 
the substantive evidence introduced in 
the trial at Manila, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the offense of which General 
Yamashita was charged constituted a 
violation of the laws of war: 
The question then is whether the 
law of war imposes on an army 
commander a duty to take such 
appropriate measures as are within 
his power to control the troops 
under his command for the pre-
ventipn of the specified acts 
which are violations of the law of 
war and which are likcly to attcnd 
the occupation of hostile territory 
by an uncontrolled soldiery, and 
whether he may be charged with 
personal responsibility for his 
failure to take such measures 
when violations result. That this 
was the precise issue to be tried 
was made clear by the statement 
of the prosecution at the opening 
of the trial. 
It is evident that the conduct 
of military operations by troops 
whose excesses are unrestrained 
by the orders or efforts of their 
commander would almost cer-
tainly result in violations which it 
is the purpose of the law of war to 
prevent .... 
These provisions plainly imposed 
on petitioner ... an affirmative 
duty to take such measures as 
were within his power and ap-
propriate in the circumstances to 
protect prisoners of war and the 
ci·'ilian PQPulation?4 
In order 'to reinforce the point that 
the Court was not examining the evi-
dence with respect to the critical ques-
tion of responsibility described above, 
the Court first said, "We do not here 
appraise the evidence on which peti-
tioner was convicted," and then in a 
footnote to the same paragraph re-
iterated, "We do not weigh the evi-
dence. We merely held that the charge 
sufficiently states a violation against the 
law of war .... 25 
Those who read the Supreme Court's 
decision and were disappointed with its 
ambiguous nature and its failure to 
discuss certain questions raised by the 
defense should not be surprised to find 
the ambiguity deliberate. In a letter to 
the legal historian John P. Frank less 
than 1 month after the decision, Associ-
ate Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rut-
ledge related that the argument over the 
Yamashita case and its constitutional 
implications was bitter and deep. Chief 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone deliberately 
omitted whole sections of constitutional 
argument from the majority opinion 
because of an inability of the majority 
to agree on its rationale.2 6 
'rhe bitte~ dissents of Justices Rut-
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ledge and Frank Murphy raised severe 
questions about the fairness of the trial 
as well as the judicial principles asserted. 
Murphy and Rutledge questioned the 
rules of evidence which varied con-
siderably from those used at the time in 
U.S. courts-martials, the haste of the 
trial, denial of fifth amendment rights 
to the accused, and the appropriateness 
of the charge? 7 In describing the 
process Murphy charged that: 
The trial proceeded with great 
dispatch without allowing the de-
fense time to prepare an adequate 
case. Petitioner's rights under due 
process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment were grossly and 
openly violated without any jus-
tification. All of this was done 
without any thorough investiga-
tion and prosecution of those 
immediately responsible for the 
atrocities, out of which might 
have come some proof or indica-
tion of personal culpability on 
petitioner's part.2 8 
Associate Justice Rutledge attacked the 
fairness of the trial with equal fervor: 
One basic protection of our sys-
tem and one only, petitioner has 
had. He has been represented by 
able counsel, officers of the army 
he fought .... But, as will appear, 
even this conceded shield was 
taken away in much of its value, 
by denial of reasonable oppor-
tunity for them to perform their 
functions. 29 
In referring to the last minute addi-
tion of a Supplemental Bill of Particu-
lars alleging 59 additional offenses and 
the denial of additional time for the 
defense to prepare their case, Rutledge 
caustically added: " ... this wide de-
parture from the most elementary prin-
ciples of fairness vitiated the proceed-
ings. When added to the other denials of 
fundamental right sketched above, it 
deprived the proceedings of any sem-
blance of trial as we know that institu-
tion.,,30 
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To those who would charge unfair-
ness on the basis of the comments 
above, we would respond that the 
Supreme Court in its review of the case 
sustained the proceedings. Although the 
majority ruled neither on the substance 
of the evidence nor the question of 
fairness per se, they held that the 
offense charged was a violation of the 
laws of war and that the safeguards of 
the fifth amendment and the require-
ments of the Articles of War were not 
applicable to a prisoner of war charged 
with war crimes committed prior to his 
capture.3 1 Put squarely, unfairness was 
upheld. 
At this point we should question 
why legal scholars have asserted that 
there was "no evidence that he [Yama-
shita] knew of" the atrocities. 3 2 The 
answer appeal\S straightforward- The 
Military Commission failed to address 
the question of knowledge explicitly, 
and the report of the Board of Review 
was not published. No observer knew 
what the generals and the various re-
viewing authorities really believed. This 
vacuum of understanding was quickly 
preempted by a very aggressive defense 
team and one of its members in particu-
lar, A.. Frank Reel. In the trial at Manila, 
the hearing before the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Washington, and the campaign 
waged in the press both before and after 
Yamashita's execution, Reel and his 
comrades leaned heavily on a line of 
defense which asserted a lack of credible 
evidence linking Yamashita to the 
atrocities. These assertions were re-
peated so often that they became ac-
cepted as facts. Associate Justices 
Murphy and Rutledge incorporated 
Reel's contentions concerning lack of 
credible evidence in their sharp dissents 
and commented on the Government's 
failure to refute them. 3 3 
After the trial Reel wrote an inter-
esting account of the Yamashita pro· 
ceedings which received widespread 
publicity and is often used as a reposi-
tory of facts about the trial.34 In his 
account Reel proved to his own satisfac-
tion that any evidence which linked 
Yamashita to the crimes should not 
have been admitted or was discredited 
when introduced. Subsequent discus-
sions of the trial have for the most part 
accepted Reel's vit::ws as stated by him 
and by the two dissenting Supreme 
Court Justices.3 5 
Rutledge's and Murphy's views con-
cerning the fairness of the trial, their 
views on the lack of evidence linking 
Yamashita to the crimes, and Reel's 
unchallenged declarations have colored 
the popular view of the Yamashita trial. 
It would be well for us to remember 
that substantial evidence was introduced 
which directly linked Yamashita to the 
crimes. In one instance his own Judge 
Advocate testified that he had received 
personal permission from Yamashita to 
allow the Japanese military police to 
punish captured Filipino guerrillas with-
out trial.3 6 The charge that such evi-
dence could not have been admissible in 
a U.S. court is irrelevant to our under-
standing of the meaning of the Yama-
shita verdict. More importantly, the 
Supreme Court declined to review the 
evidentiary rules, and the Military Com-
mission heard evidence under these rules 
which tended to show General Yama-
shita knew of the crimes. Hence, the 
conviction reflected an example of 
command responsibility in which a com-
mander was convicted for crimes com-
mitted by his forces about which he 
knew and failed to take action or may 
even have directed. 
What then should we make of the 
Yamashita case? Telford Taylor'S thesis 
that war crimes trials are what people 
think happened proves most valid in this 
trial. Evidence exists to support the 
belief that both the members of the 
Military Commission and the Reviewing 
Authority (General MacArthur) believed 
that Yamashita knew of the atrocities 
committed by his forces and either 
ordered them or, at minimum, know-
ingly permitted them. Hence the ver-
dict was consistent with the accepted 
principle of the international law of war 
that a commander is responsible for 
those actions which he directed or 
sanctiolled. However, a combination of 
circumstances established in the Yama-
shita case a perception of a principle of 
absolute responsibility. The factors lead-
ing to this misperception were: lack of 
information as to whether or not the 
Military Commission believed Yama-
shita; lack of information concerning 
the basis upon which General Mac-
Arthur sustained the conviction and 
sentence; the ambiguity of certain por-
tions of the Military Commission's judg-
ment; the hearsay nature of the evi-
dence which linked Yamashita to the 
atrocities; and the manner in which the 
defense counsel and the dissenting 
Supreme Coutt Justices couched the 
central issue. The defense counsel, the 
Supreme Court Justices, and legal 
scholars appeared to believe that the 
Military Commission accepted Yama-
shita's protestations of ignorance at face 
value and convicted him in spite of 
them. Justice Frank Murphy's descrip-
tion of the action taken against Yama-
shita, unchallenged in the majority 
opinion, reflects the view held su bse-
quently by most students of interna-
tionallaw: 
He [Yamashita] was not charged 
with personally participating in 
acts of atrocity or with ordering 
or condoning their commission. 
Not even knowledge of these 
crimes was attributed to him. It 
was simply alleged that he unlaw-
fully disregarded and failed to 
discharge his duty as commander 
to control the operations of mem-
bers of his command, permi tting 
them to commit the acts of 
atrocity.37 
Legal scholars have subsequently ac-
cepted the so·called Yamashita principle 
as Justice Murphy stated it without 
reconciling it to later trials at Nurem-
berg or elsewhere. 
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It should be apparent from the evi-
dence presented that the public percep-
tion of a Yamashita principle of abso-
lute command responsibility should be 
rejected and its use discredited. Con-
trary to popular belief, substantial evi-
dence was introduced in the trial linking 
Yamashita to the crimes for which he 
was charged. Although the evidence 
might be inadmissible by today's stan-
dards, the Supreme Court declined to 
review the evidentiary rules and thus 
allowed them to stand. More impor-
tantly, the Military Commission ac-
cepted the evidence as presented; the 
judgment gives no reason to believe 
otherwise. Further, the Board of Review 
left little doubt that it believed General 
Yamashita knew of the offenses and 
hence was guilty under established inter-
national law. Thus, the generals who sat 
in judgment convicted a military com-
mander whose troops committed war 
crimes and who learned about the 
atrocities and took no punitive or pre-
ventive action. This result clearly con-
flicts with the various reports of the 
Yamashita case which usually assert that 
no credible evidence was found to link 
the Japanese general with the offenses 
and then announce a principle based 
upon that assertion. 
The next section of. this paper will 
. examine the Nuremberg Subsequent 
Proceedings which provide a precise and 
reasonable articulation of command 
responsibility rendered in an acceptable 
judicial environment. 
The Nuremberg Subsequent Proceed-
ings. The principle of limited command 
responsibility articulated at Nuremberg 
is consistent with the command respon-
sibility doctrine cited in the Yamashita 
case. It is no accident that Telford 
Taylor selected the word "Nuremberg" 
for use in the title of a book concerning 
principles derived from all war crimes 
trials following the Second World War. 
To the American public Nuremberg is 
both synonymous with war crimes trials 
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and perceived as the accepted standard 
of such trials. Additionally, the conduct 
of the trials at Nuremberg evoked less 
criticism of their fairness and received 
far more praise for their judicial re-
straint than did certain of the U.S. 
Military Commissions in the Far East or 
the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East.3 8 
Two types of trials were conducted 
at Nuremberg. During 1945-1946 the 
In ternational Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg tried the major war crimi-
nals including Goering, Hess, Keitel, 
Speer, and others. Upon completion of 
this tribunal, the United States, under 
international auspices, conducted the 
Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings; 
these consisted of 12 trials against major 
groups of German leaders, including 
government ministers, justices, diplo-
mats, and others. Two cases against 
military leaders have relevance for the 
study of "Command Responsibility": 
Case No.7, U.S. v. List et. al., "The 
Hostages case"; and Case No. 12, U.S. v. 
von Leeb et. al., "The High Command 
case." 
"The High Command case" con-
cerned the trial of 14 German Army, 
Navy, and Air Force leaders for plotting 
aggressive war and implementing illegal 
orders such as the "Commissar Order," 
the "Barbarossa Order," the "Com-
mando Order," and the "Night and Fog 
Decree." Most of the alleged offenses 
occurred on the Russian front.3 9 
The most prominent defendant in 
"The High Command case" was Field 
Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, who com-
manded, among other units, Army 
Group North on the Russian front from 
June 1941 to January 1942. Von Leeb 
was charged with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity through the commis-
sion of crimes against enemy belliger-
ents and prisoners of war. Specifically, 
the Chief Counsel of War Crimes, Brig. 
Gen. Telford Taylor, charged that Von 
Leeb: implemented the "Commissar 
Order" callil}g for the immediate execu-
tion of Soviet political officers captured 
by German forces; implemented the 
"Barbarossa" jurisdictional order which 
called for the execution of captured 
Russian partisans; and condoned crimes 
against civilians through the activities of 
the Einsatzgruppes which operated in 
the Army Group rear area and were 
responsible for the execution of thou-
sands of civilians.4 0 
Von Leeb put forward a vigorous 
defense. First, he asserted that he had 
opposed illegal orders such as the "Com-
missar Order" and had not disseminated 
them. Second, he maintained that he 
had received no reports of executions of 
Russian soldiers or civilians and that he 
was unaware of the operations of the 
Einsatzgruppes, although credible evi-
dence proved that their activities were 
widespread and notorious.4 1 
In effect, Von Leeb presented a 
defense that had many elements in 
common with that of General Yama-
shita. How was it received? The prosecu-
tion's closing arguments in the Von 
Leeb case were reminiscent of the prose-
cution arguments at Manila in the fall of 
1945. In respect to Von Leeb himself, 
the prosecution, under Taylor's direc-
tion, charged: 
The prosecution suggests that 
these so-called "defenses" are 
miserable fabrications, and that 
the record proves incontrovertibly 
that the Commissar Order was 
distributed and carried out within 
von Leeb's Army Group, with von 
Leeb's knowledge and resulted in 
the outright murder of numerous 
prisoners of war . . .. Whether von 
Leeb himself passed the order to 
the Fiftieth Corps, or whether, 
knowing that the Sixteenth Army 
would pass the orders to them, he 
took no action to prevent this, 
seems to the prosecution a totally 
academic question .... von Leeb's 
testimony that he did not learn of 
the reports concerning the shoot-
ings of commissars pursuant to 
the order is totally incredible.42 
In its judgment the tribunal ex-
amined closely the evidence directly 
linking Von Leeb with crimes against 
enemy belligerents or prisoners of war 
and found him not guilty of executing 
Red army soldiers within his area, not 
guilty of the murder or slave labor 
recruitment of civilians in his area, not 
guilty of the pillage of public and 
private property, and not guilty of 
criminal conduct in the siege of Lenin-
grad. What is signficant about this find-
ing is that Von Leeb was found not 
guilty of the first two charges even 
though credible evidence was presented 
that such criminal activities occurred 
within his Army Group area. The court 
found Von Leeb guilty of implementing 
the "Barbarossa" jurisdiction order 
which specifie~ execution for certain 
types of Russian guerrillas captured. He 
was sentenced to 3 years in prison, given 
credit for pretrial confinement, and 
released at the end of the trial.4 3 
In its judgment rendered on Von 
Leeb and his codefendants, the court 
dealt rather specifically with the subject 
of command responsibility: 
Modern war such as the last war 
entails a large measure of decen-
tralization. A high commander 
cannot keep completely informed 
of the details of military opera-
tions of subordinates and most 
assuredly not of every administra-
tive measure. He has the right to 
assume that details entrusted to 
responsible subordinates will be 
legally executed. The President of 
the United States is Commander 
in Chief of its military forces. 
Criminal acts committed by those 
forces cannot in themselves be 
charged to him on the theory of 
subordination. The same is true of 
other high commanders in the 
chain of command. Criminality 
does not attach to every individ-
ual in this phain of command 
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from that fact alone. There must 
be a personal dereliction. That can 
occur only where the act is di-
rectly traceable to him or where 
his failure to properly supervise 
his subordinates constitutes 
criminal negligence on his part. In 
the latter case it must be a per-
sonal neglect amounting to a 
wanton, immoral disregard of the 
action of his subordinates 
amounting to acquiescence.4 4 
Later the tribunal stated explicitly 
that, " ... the commander must have 
knowledge of these offenses and ac-
quisesce or participate or criminally 
neglect to interfere in their commission 
and that the offenses must be patently 
criminal. ,,4 5 
In dealing with its judgment on Von 
Leeb, the tribunal categorically rejected 
the prosecution's arguments and said: 
The evidence suggests that crimi-
nal orders were executed by units 
subordinate to the defendant and 
criminal acts were carried out by 
agencies under his command. But 
it is not considered under the 
situation outlined that criminal 
responsibility attaches to him 
merely on the theory of su bordi-
nation and overall command. He 
must be shown both to have had 
knowledge and to have been con-
nected with such criminal acts 
either by way of participation or 
criminal acquiescence.4 6 
Additionally, the court further stated 
in another part of the Von Leeb judg-
ment: 
While he [von Leeb] had the right 
to issue orders to his subordinates 
concerning such matters, he also 
had the right to assume that the 
officers in command of those 
units would properly perform the 
function which had been en-
trusted to them by higher authori-
ties, both as to the proper care of 
prisoners of war or the uses to 
which they might be put.47 
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The cases of Von Leeb's codefen-
dants are not of concern here since 
those who were found guilty of crimes 
against enemy belligerents or prisoners 
of war faced overwhelming evidence 
which linked them to both knowledge 
and direction of such crimes. No real 
doubt exists that a commander who 
directs illegal acts against civilians or 
prisoners of war or who knows of such 
acts by troops under his command and 
fails to take proper action bears criminal 
responsibility . 
A second Nuremberg trial which 
offers insights into the issue of com-
mand responsibility was the trial of 
Wilhelm List and others, commonly 
known as the "Hostages Case." Field 
Marshal Wilhelm List and 11 other 
German officers were brought to trial 
during the Nuremberg Subsequent Pro-
ceedings on the charge that they had 
committed war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The charges reflected 
the cruel and bloody reprisals, including 
the shooting of hostages, that the Ger-
man generals had inflicted on the popu-
lations of Greece, Yugoslavia, and 
Albania. All but two of the defendants 
were found guilty in varying degrees.48 
The case affirmed the principle of 
the responsibility of the commander for 
the actions of his forces. On the other 
hand, specific evidence was introduced 
linking knowledge of the atrocities, as 
well as direction in some instances, to 
the defendants. Defendants in this case 
were unable to prove ignorance since 
lesser officials regularly reported all 
reprisals to the senior commanders. 
Several of the defendants were found 
not guilty of implementing the "Com-
missar . Order" within their units al-
though cases of its implementation were 
proven. The prosecution lost on such 
charges when it was unable to link the 
defendants with direct knowledge of the 
crimes.49 
The implications of the Nuremberg 
Subsequent Proceedings for the issue of 
command responsibility are impressive. 
In a series of trials conducted under 
international auspices, panels of U.S. 
civilian judges, operating in a more 
judicial atmosphere than that which 
prevailed in Manila in 1945, rejected the 
doctrine of absolute command responsi-
bility apparently established in the 
Yamashita case and established more 
limited and reasonable standards con-
cerning a commander's responsibility 
for the actions of his command. The 
negligence of the commander had to be 
"personal." Knowledge of the crime had 
to be shown. The civilian judges at 
Nuremberg seemed better able than the 
generals at Manila to acknowledge the 
difficulties of discipline in unusual situa-
tions, the reliance of a commander on 
his subordinates, and the breadth and 
scope of activities under the control of 
senior military commanders. 
Vietnam. Telford Taylor's allegations 
against General Westmoreland and other 
U.S. military commanders are based 
upon the underlying assumption that 
war crimes committed by U.S. forces 
have been so numerous that U.S. mili-
tary leaders should have known of them 
and hence prevented them. This allega-
tion has been stated more explicitly by 
others.s 0 
How can the U.S. military leaders 
reply? This is a question which every 
military professional must be able to 
discuss. A reply to this question might 
proceed on two different planes. First, 
the number of criminal or unlawful acts 
committed by U.S. forces would not 
seem as widespread to a U.S. general as 
they would to a Telford Taylor or a 
Richard Falk because many of the acts 
considered unlawful by Taylor or Falk 
might be considered legal under interna-
tional law. Second, U.S. military leaders 
could establish a vigorous affirmative 
defense through demonstration of the 
command policies, command briefings, 
individual briefings, and punishments 
rendered against perpetuators of unlaw-
ful acts. Each of the two planes will be 
briefly presented. 
What are the unlllwful acts charged 
against the United States? The charges 
include: excessive use of aerial and 
artillery firepower resulting in the un-
necessary death of civilians, unlawful 
relocation pf South Vietnamese civil-
ians, wanton destruction of property, 
and torture and murder of prisoners of 
war.51 
The first line of defense of a U.S. 
military leader against charges of wide-
spread criminal activity in Vietnam is to 
assert that many of the acts branded 
unlawful by the "war crimes publicists" 
are acts which are legally defensible 
under the U.S. Government's interpreta-
tion of the international law of war. 
What is not understood by most of the 
pu blic and is ~gnored by many of the 
military's detractors is that the number 
of criminal acts committed by U.S. 
forces is a function of how one ad-
dresses four specific issues: the interna-
tional legality of the U.S. presence in 
Vietnam, the independence of the 
Saigon regime, the intent of the U.S. 
military commanders in implementing 
certain courses of strategy and tactics, 
and the reasonableness of the reply to a 
charge of conducting certain "unlawful 
acts" that the acts were indeed lawful. 
Telford Taylor acknowledged part of 
this matrix of issues in Nuremberg and 
Vietnam. 52 
The legality of the American pres-
ence and the independence of the Sai-
gon' regime place the legal relationship 
of the U.S. forces to the South Vietna-
mese citizens on a considerably dif-
ferent basis than that which would 
obtain if the U.S. forces were occupying 
South Vietnam following an invasion. 
The position that the U.S. Government 
can offer on this issue is at least as 
strong as the position of the Govern-
ment's detractors. Persuasive briefs 
which a reasonable man should find 
believable hav~ been written supporting 
409 
the U.S. position.5 3 Acceptance of the 
reasonableness of the legality of the 
U.S. intervention and the independence 
of the Saigon regime strengthens con-
siderably the already strong legal de-
fense of civilian relocation, for example. 
The citizens of a cobelligerent do not 
enjoy the same protections from their 
allies that the civilians of an occupied 
nation should expect from the occupier. 
A country's power to relocate its in-
habitants in order to prosecute a war is 
virtually unlimited. 5 4 The lack of 
clamor concerning extensive relocation 
activities in Kenya and Malaya is mute 
evidence of international acceptance of 
such practices. One has to recognize 
only that the United States has a reason-
able legal defense of its intervention, 
without accepting that defense, in order 
to undercut certain of the war crimes 
charges. Relocation activities may also 
be defended by recourse to the "Hos-
tages case" at Nuremberg wherein the 
tribunal declared that the inhabitants of 
occupied territories may be relocated in 
order to prosecute antiguerrilla cam-
paignS.55 
Intent is perhaps the major con-
sideration in the question of the use of 
airpower and artillery. If the United 
States intended to use air and artillery 
to terrorize the peasantry or for re-
prisals, as Neil Sheehan charges, then 
such use would probably be illegal. 56 
On the other hand, a military com-
mander may legally employ air and 
artillery firepower against a populated 
area from which he is receiving fire or 
which is offering armed resistance.5 7 It 
is unfortunate but not illegal if the 
commander unintentionally erred in his 
judgment about the size of the force he 
faced and caused excessive civilian 
casualties. Precise estimates of enemy 
strength are extraordinarily difficult in 
fighting guerrillas in or near villages. 
Two snipers armed with Russian AK47 
automatic rifles can sound like a 
platoon, thereby causing an opposing 
pIa toon commander to decide he needs 
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fire support to neutralize the enemy 
opposition. 
The natural tendency of battlefield 
commanders is to take steps to avoid 
excessive casualties to their own units 
through the employment of all fire-
power means available to them. Ad-
mittedly, such practices can produce 
counterproductive results in guerrilla 
wars, but it is international legality and 
not effectiveness of counterinsurgency 
practices with which we are concerned. 
This tendency to minimize battlefield 
casualties results, to some extent, from 
the responsibility felt by American 
leaders to account to the American 
public for the lives of their sons. Lest 
anyone assert that manifestations of this 
tendency in Vietnam are evidence of 
racist attitudes toward "inferior 
peoples," on$ need only recollect the 
extravagant artillery and tactical air-
power the United States employed 
against the Germans in Western Europe 
in 1944-1945. 
In their concern with civilian casual-
ties, the media representatives have lost 
sight of the fact that international law 
provides only the most rudimentary 
protections to civilians caught in the 
midst of combat operations. Although 
civilians enjoy an immunity from direct 
attack, it is not an absolute immunity. 
The law of war acknowledges that the 
killing and wounding of civilians is often 
an incidental aspect of the lawful con-
duct of military operations. Incidental 
injury to civilians is not unlawful so 
long as it does not violate a mandatory 
rule of the law of war, is justified by the 
rule of necessity, and the suffering 
caused is not disproportionate to the 
military advantage gained. 5 8 Even the 
more recent Draft Rules for the Limita-
tion of the Dangers Incurred by the 
Civilian Population in Time of War 
specifically recognize the limited nature 
of the immunity enjoyed by the civilian 
population. 5 9 As Telford Taylor puts it, 
"The death of an infant in consequence 
of military .operations ... does not 
establish that a war crime has been 
commi tted. ,,6 0 
The important point is that an in-
formed and objective observer, viewing 
the battlefield, would not perceive as 
many unlawful acts as Richard Falk 
might see. The informed and objective 
observer would understand the intent 
behind many of the actions that others 
might consider unlawful and the specific 
context within which they occurred. 
Hence, it is a Procrustean feat to charge 
that the military leaders are guilty of 
war crimes because so many war crimes 
took place that they must have known 
of them and perhaps ordered them. 
Battlefield actions which in Richard 
Falk's view are criminal may seem law-
ful and necessary, even if tragic, to the 
knowledgeable officer. . 
It must be noted that the previously 
described defense of the military is 
asserted only within an admittedly nar-
row framework of international law 
since it is within this framework that 
the military's critics purport to operate 
as they accuse the United States of war 
crimes. The paper does not attempt to 
reply on the more transcendent moral 
plane. 
The second part of the reply of the 
American military leader to the charge 
of war crimes would be to assert the 
number of actions taken to prevent war 
crimes. General Westmoreland, General 
Abrams, and the entire military chain of 
command can establish an active de-
fense by demonstrating the steps taken 
in war crimes prevention-a case which 
none of the German or Japanese gen-
erals could argue. Space limitations pre-
clude full development of the U.S. 
defense, but the outline will be 
sketched. The Vietnam participant can 
expand this from his own experience. 
From the early days of the buildup 
of U.S. ground forces, the J\merican 
command in Saigon took strong, active 
steps to minimize civilian casualties. The 
command action proceeded along three 
dimensions; (1) command policies 
passed through the chain of command, 
(2) briefings for the individual soldier, 
and (3) investigation of apparent unlaw-
ful acts and punishment of perpetrators. 
Perusal of the Military Assistance Com-
mand Vietnam (MACV) files indicates 
that minimization of civilian casualties, 
treatment of enemy prisoners, and the 
rules of engagement which govern fire-
power use were major concerns of the 
U.S. commander. The records of the 
commanders' conferences held by Gen-
eral Westmoreland contain periodic 
warnings to this effect.6 1 The policies 
and rules of engagement have been 
declared "virtually impeccable" even by 
Telford Taylor62 and were eulogized by 
a representative of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross who pro-
nounced the MACV policy for the 
handling of POW's, " ... a brilliant ex-
pression of a liberal and realistic atti-
tude.,,63 Commanders' conferences 
down to division level usually included 
similar admonitions concerning civilian 
casualties, handling of POW's, and the 
rules of engagement. 
A second aspect of U.S. policy con-
cerns the briefs received by individual 
soldiers. Each soldier arriving in Viet-
nam received from his unit a briefing 
concerning the rules of engagement, 
attitudes toward civilians, and the 
handling of prisoners of war. More 
importantly, he was issued two small 
wallet-sized cards called, "Nine Rules" 
and "The Enemy in Your Hands." The 
"Nine Rules" stressed the necessity to 
maintain a humane attitude toward the 
Vietnamese people. "The Enemy in 
Your Hands" reiterated in simplified 
terms the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention concerning the handling of 
prisoners of war. Many commanders of 
combat units regularly inspected their 
commands to ensure retention of these 
cards. 
Finally, one must take note of the 
punitive aspects of U.S. policy. MACV's 
policy required investigation of all alle-
gations of uljllawful acts and courts-
411 
martial where appropriate. During the 
period 1965 to 1971, investigated al-
legations of war crimes or of offenses of 
violence against Vietnamese nationals 
resulted in the conviction of 176 U.S. 
Army personnel and 22 sentences of life 
imprisonment to members of all ser-
vices.64 Some of the more sensational 
press stories about atrocities have re-
sulted from evidence introduced at 
courts-martials. The fact that individuals 
were court-martialed for the offenses 
was underplayed in the rush to describe 
"current military practices. ,,65 
Conclusion. What conclusions can be 
drawn from this analysis? First, the legal 
realities of the Yamashita case differ 
considerably from the public percep-
tion. Contrary to references in recent 
books and articles, the Yamashita case 
did not establish a standard of absolute 
command responsibility wherein a com-
mander could be held criminally liable 
for the actions of his command even if 
he was ignorant of their transgressions 
or was unable to influence them. The 
Military Commission which tried Gen-
eral Yamashita heard evidence which 
directly linked him to the knowledge of 
offenses committed by his troops. On 
the basis of this evidence, the Commis-
sion found Yamashita gUilty of failing 
to control his subordinates. The case 
represents a reasonable standard of com-
mand responsibility which states that a 
c·ommander can be held liable for the 
actions of his troops if he knows of 
them or blatantly ignores them and fails 
to take appropriate action. 
The Nuremberg Subsequent Proceed-
ings provide a clearer example of limited 
command responsibility consistent with 
this paper's view of the Yamashita case. 
The Court in the "High Command case" 
was quite explicit in its rationale. The 
judgment stated that dereliction must 
be personal and knowledge must be 
shown in order to convict commanders 
for the offenses committed by their 
command. In view of the judicious and 
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restrained nature of the Nuremberg 
trials and the expansive rationale of-
fered by the court, why is it that the 
war crimes publicists feel compelled to 
apply their version of the Yamashita 
case to U_S. conduct in Vietnam? The 
teachers and students of international 
law need to reconsider such actions. 
The war crimes trials examined in 
this paper offer a reasonable and fairly 
unambiguous standard concerning com-
mand responsibility under the interna-
tional law of war. A commander is 
responsible for the actions of his sub-
ordinates. He is required to take steps to 
prevent war crimes, to halt their con-
tinuation when he discovers them, and 
to punish the wrongdoers. He would be 
found guilty if he knew of crimes 
committed by members of his command 
or had reaso~ to know of them and 
failed to take the requisite action. The 
tribunals left unanswered the degree of 
efficiency required from the com-
mander in preventing war crimes, in 
discovering information about them, 
and in punishing wrongdoers. In many 
ways, this is the core issue between the 
u.s. generals and their accusers con-
cerning Vietnam. The generals probably 
wish they had been more efficient in 
preventing unlawful actions. The ac-
cusers seem to be demanding perfection. 
Resolution of this dilemma lies in the 
question of "intent." 
The Falks and the Sheehans seem to 
forget that culpability in war crimes 
often hangs on "intent." The legal 
defense available to u.s. leaders com-
bined with a genuine demonstrated in-
tent to minimize civilian casualties 
provides a defense of such strength that 
it strains the imagination of a knowl-
edgeable observer to visualize any senior 
U.S. military leader being convicted 
under the Nuremberg precedent for U.S. 
practices in Vietnam. 
Three conclusions emerge. First, the 
so-called Yamashita principle does not 
exist legally. Second, the Nuremberg 
trials established a standard of com-
mand responsibility which demands 
proof of personal negligence or personal 
participation. Third, the U.S. military 
actions in Vietnam are backed by a solid 
defense of policy, deeds, and intent. 
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